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ABSTRACT South Africa is a highly distributively unequal country, and its inequality 
continues to be largely along racial lines. Such circumstances call for assessment from 
the perspective of contemporary theories of distributive justice. Three such theories – 
Rawlsian justice, utilitarianism, and luck egalitarianism – are described and applied. 
Rawls’ difference principle recommends that the worst off be made as well as they can 
be, a standard which South Africa clearly falls short of. Utilitarianism recommends the 
maximization of overall societal well-being, a goal which South Africa again fails to 
achieve given its severe inequality and the fact of the diminishing marginal value of 
money – that a given amount of money tends to produce more utility for a poor person 
than it does for a rich person. The final theory, luck egalitarianism, aims to make 
distributions sensitive to individual exercises of responsibility. This view also objects to 
South Africa’s inequality, this time on the basis that the poor are overwhelmingly worse 
off through no fault or choice of their own. These major theories of distributive justice 
therefore all propose large scale redistribution to the benefit of the (predominantly black) 
poor. Perhaps more surprisingly, all three views also provide support for class-based 






Contemporary South Africa is characterized by marked distributive inequality. South 
Africa’s income Gini coefficient is 57.8, indicating the eighth highest level of inequality 
out of 169 countries surveyed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme, 
2010). The top quintile has a 65 per cent share of annual household consumption 
expenditure, while the bottom quintile has a 3 per cent share (Statistics South Africa, 
2011a, p. 45). Even within richer groups, wealth is highly concentrated: 4 per cent of the 
population earn 40 per cent of national income (South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2010, p. 182).  
Such high levels of inequality would raise questions even had they arisen through 
historical processes that were unremarkable by global standards. However, the peculiar 
injustices of South Africa’s modern history cast a long shadow. Two decades after the 
end of apartheid, inequality is still largely along racial lines. White personal income is 
eight times higher than African personal income (South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2010, p. 181). African-headed households have average consumption 
expenditure of R45,000, while white-headed households have consumption expenditure 
of R235,000 (Statistics South Africa, 2011a, p. 11). Even more extremely, 25 per cent of 
African-headed households fall in the bottom expenditure quintile, compared to less than 
1 per cent of white-headed households (Statistics South Africa, 2011a, p. 8). Half of 
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Africans, but only 1 per cent of whites, live in relative poverty (South African Institute of 
Race Relations, 2010, p. 273).1 
This article examines these distributive features of South Africa from the 
viewpoint of contemporary political theory. More specifically, it considers these issues 
from the perspectives of three prominent Anglo-American theories of distributive justice: 
John Rawls’ famous justice as fairness (Rawls, 1999a, 1993); utilitarianism, which Rawls 
treated as the chief rival theory and which has been developed further in the late 
twentieth century (Bentham, 1970; Hare, 1981); and the main post-Rawlsian egalitarian 
theory, luck egalitarianism (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989).2 These theories have not to 
date been systematically applied to South Africa.3 
There is an obvious rationale for applying these three theories to post-apartheid 
South Africa. With the exception of Rawls’ position (Rawls, 1999b), the theories are 
intended to be ‘cosmopolitan’, having global extent (Singer, 1993, 2002; Knight, 2008, 
2012; Tan, 2012), and some argue that even Rawlsian justice is best construed as 
cosmopolitan (Beitz, 1979; Pogge, 1989). In addition, a second, less obvious rationale for 
applying such theories in the South African context can be developed which does not rely 
on cosmopolitan premises.  
The preamble to the Constitution aims to ‘establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights’ (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
But while South Africa is now democratized, and the constitution itself contains a bill of 
rights focusing on fundamental rights, there is no fixed view in public life on what social 
or distributive justice consists in. The Constitution addresses the topic only in the most 
general terms, noting, for instance, that expropriation must be ‘for a public purpose or in 
the public interest’ and ‘subject to compensation’ decided by agreement or by the courts 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996, sec. 25). The intention of its authors was presumably for 
fuller guiding principles to be decided democratically, but such principles have failed to 
materialize, which may explain the magnitude of the continuing inequality. Political 
theory may be able to provide the missing principles, and Anglophone political theory, 
with its focus on individual rights – a focus shared by the Constitution, which rejects 
‘group rights, on which the mystique of apartheid had so largely depended’ (Davenport 
and Saunders, 2000, p. 572) – may seem a particularly useful perspective. 
I argue that there is a significant degree of congruence in the practical 
prescriptions of Rawlsian justice, utilitarianism, and luck egalitarianism in the context of 
contemporary South Africa. One of my two main findings will not be surprising to those 
familiar with contemporary political theory and the current distribution in South Africa. 
All three theories recommend significant redistribution to the benefit of the poor. The 
second main finding may, however, be less obvious. I maintain that these theories all 
recommend that existing racial affirmative action policies be replaced with affirmative 
action to benefit economically disadvantaged groups. While the upshot of the 
redistribution and affirmative action would undoubtedly be a major net transfer of 
resources and opportunities from the white (and, to a lesser extent, Indian and coloured) 
to the black population, the rationale for this would not be racial. Rather, blacks are 
disproportionately poor, and their poverty cannot be justified on Rawlsian, utilitarian, or 
luck egalitarian premises. 
Before proceeding, I should address a worry one might have about the 
appropriateness of my approach.4 It might seem perverse to focus on theories of 
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distributive justice given the extraordinary injustices of South Africa’s recent history. 
Some form of compensatory justice may seem more fitting. But even if compensatory 
justice is necessary, it is obviously insufficient. In particular, it is hard to see how it 
would address the very significant inequalities generated in the last two decades. It 
would, for instance, do little for the precarious situation of many recent arrivals from 
other parts of Africa. Thus, some application of distributive justice, such as that I offer, is 
needed even if we accept that compensatory justice has a role. 
The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. In the first substantive section 
I describe the three distributive theories alluded to above, and provide a simple 
illustration of their respective appeal. In each of the subsequent sections I apply one of 





The first theory of distributive justice to be considered is Rawls’ justice as fairness. 
Rawls is often regarded as the greatest English-language philosopher of the 20th century, 
and certainly its greatest political philosopher. His magnus opus, A Theory of Justice, was 
published in 1971. It offers a modern form of social contract theory, arguing that the 
appropriate arrangement of a society’s ‘basic structure’ – its main social and economic 
institutions – can be ascertained by imagining the arrangement that would be selected by 
self-interested individuals in a hypothetical ‘original position’. In the original position 
individuals are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that deprives them of information about their 
particular preferences, objectives, and talents, though they have access to general social 
and economic information (Rawls, 1999a). In other words, they know their society, but 
not their position in it. 
Rawls maintains that persons in the original position would be concerned to 
secure the things most essential to pursuing their goals, whatever they may prove to be, 
even at the cost of foregoing the possibility of great material benefits. He thus suggests 
that individuals would prize equal provision of the basic liberties (political liberties, 
freedom of thought, freedom of association, and so on) above all, and once these were 
satisfied insist on a robust form of equal opportunity (‘fair equality of opportunity’). Only 
then would they be concerned to secure income and wealth, and given the possibility that 
they may be the worst off members of society, they would choose to maximize the 
amount of income and wealth of the worst off class, as proposed by the ‘difference 
principle’. Thus, Rawlsian justice identifies three considerations of justice, in the 
following order: first, equal basic liberties are to be secured; second, fair equality of 
opportunity is to secured; finally, economic inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged group (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 266-267). 
The next theory is utilitarianism, which can be traced, in a developed form, at 
least as far back as the 18th century and Jeremy Bentham (1970). Rawls himself took this 
as the dominant theory of morals and politics, and developed justice as fairness in 
response to it. Central to utilitarianism is individual utility or welfare, which is a matter 
of how well an individual’s life is going for them. Utilitarianism maintains that an action 
is good insofar as it increases overall welfare, and bad insofar as it decreases overall 
welfare. Often, as in this article, utilitarianism is understood as having a corresponding 
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theory of justice, which equates distributive justice with maximizing welfare (see Mill, 
1969; Hare, 1981; Kelly, 1990). 
A major internal dispute among utilitarians concerns the appropriate measure of 
welfare. Bentham associates it with hedonic pleasure, a view with which J. S. Mill 
broadly agreed though he suggests that ‘higher’, more intellectual pleasures make a 
greater contribution to welfare. Others have followed Aristotle (1954) in focusing on 
‘objective lists’ of goods that are required for human flourishing or, by contrast, on 
subjective assessments of happiness and life satisfaction (Sumner, 1996). R. M. Hare and 
many other present day utilitarians associate welfare with preference satisfaction, 
individuals having higher welfare levels, the more their preferences are satisfied. For our 
purposes, we need not distinguish between these philosophical views of welfare. We 
should note, however, that on all of them, welfare is strongly influenced by wealth, but is 
not just a matter of wealth. For instance, the wealthier generally have better access to 
intellectual pursuits, and to objective goods such as health; they are also generally better 
able to realize their goals and, as empirical studies in South Africa and many other 
countries have shown, happier and more satisfied with their lives (Møller, 1999; Davids 
and Gaibie, 2011). But while the wealthier are generally happier (and so on), they are not 
happier to the same extent as they are wealthier: millionaires are not hundreds of times 
happier than the poor, for instance. This general fact of the diminishing marginal value of 
money will be important later in our discussion.  
The final theory to be considered is luck egalitarianism. Since Rawls many 
writers have responded to outcome-focused theories, such as utilitarianism and Rawls’ 
own justice as fairness, by suggesting that how a distribution has been arrived at bears on 
its justifiability (see Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 2000). Kymlicka presents the following 
justification for such a move (Kymlicka, 2002). Suppose two identically talented persons 
chose to exercise their responsibility differently. One chose to work hard tending his 
crops, while the other chose to relax and play tennis all day. In a year’s time, the farmer’s 
crop is ready, and he will be well-off, but the tennis player has little to his name – even 
his tennis court is overgrown from lack of attention. In such circumstances, intuition 
suggests the farmer has at least something of a reason for resisting attempts to share his 
crop with the tennis player. Enforcement of an equal distribution seems implausible given 
that the unequal outcome has resulted from individual choices against a backdrop of 
initial equality. Even if end-state distributions are part of the picture, they do not seem to 
be the whole picture. 
Luck egalitarianism, the most prominent attempt to move away from a pure focus 
on outcomes, combines this move with a presumption in favour of equality (Arneson, 
1989; Cohen, 1989). On this view it is unjust for some to be worse off than others 
through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin, 1993). However, where there is an 
inequality that is the result of individuals’ choices, luck egalitarianism sees no injustice. 
In short, it seeks to make distributions sensitive to individual exercises of responsibility 
or, what it takes to be the same thing, equalize or neutralize the influence of luck on 
people’s prospects. 
Luck egalitarians differ among themselves on a number of points of 
interpretation, one of which should be mentioned. Some, following Ronald Dworkin’s 
well-known proto-luck egalitarianism, favour resources as the appropriate measure of 
advantage; others like Richard Arneson, treat welfare as the measure; and yet others 
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prefer different solutions, such as G. A. Cohen’s hybrid account, which uses both welfare 
and resources. As with the related dispute among utilitarians, we need not settle the 
question of exactly what advantage consists in. My earlier comments regarding welfare 
and wealth apply here also, and something similar applies regarding resources. Dworkin 
proposes the measure of an equal share of resources to be a distribution in which no 
individual favours someone else’s overall bundle of resources to their own. Crucially, 
Dworkin includes not only impersonal resources, such as wealth, but personal resources, 
which are physical and mental capabilities, including talents (Dworkin, 2000, pp. 322-
323). Thus, as is the case with welfare, Dworkinian resources increase with, but are not 
reducible to, wealth. Luck egalitarianism will inevitably be concerned with economic 
distributions, but not only with them. 
To see the appeal of these three views of distributive justice, suppose that we can 
alter a distribution in a society in any of the following three ways. First, we could 
rearrange existing economic resources such that the worst off are made as well off as they 
can be. Second, we could increase overall societal resources and welfare, though not in 
such a way that the worst off are as well off as they can be. Finally, we could rearrange 
existing resources to eliminate involuntary advantages and disadvantages, but not in a 
way that increases overall advantage levels or makes the worst off as well off as they can 
be. Were it possible, I think we would choose to achieve all three of these changes. Were 
that impossible, and we were only able to bring about one of the changes, I think we 
would feel something of a pull from each alternative. Our final decision would come 
down to the extent of the improvement (in terms of the advantage level of the worst off, 
or of overall advantage levels, or of the correspondence between advantage levels and 
choices) offered by each change.  
For instance, a very small (e.g. R10 or welfare equivalent) improvement for each 
member of the worst off quintile of society might be more valuable than a similarly small 
(e.g. R10 or welfare equivalent) improvement for the two best off quintiles, even though 
the latter provides a greater overall increase in advantage levels (for the top two quintiles 
contain more people than the bottom quintile alone). This suggests that a certain priority 
for the worst off is justified, as Rawls suggests. But it does not seem very plausible that 
that priority should be absolute as Rawls claimed. Were a possible welfare benefit for the 
better off quintiles 1000 times the size of a possible welfare benefit for the worst off 
quintile, selection of the former benefit over the latter is plausible. This suggests that 
utilitarian considerations have some weight. Similar considerations apply to luck 
egalitarianism. A large reduction in unchosen inequality (for instance, resources being 
transferred from millions of members of the rich to millions of members of the equally 
hard-working poor) would seem to be more valuable than a small improvement in overall 
advantage levels or in the condition of the worst off.5 But a very small reduction in 
unchosen inequality (for instance, resources being transferred from one member of the 
rich to one member of the equally hard-working poor) could easily be outweighed by 
even modest improvement in overall advantage levels or those of the worst off.  
In short, then, each of the three theories captures part of distributive justice. In the 
remainder of this essay I apply each theory in turn to contemporary South Africa.6 
 
 
Rawlsian Justice Applied 
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As we have seen, Rawls’ highest objective is to secure the basic liberties. While that 
would have been a pressing concern in South Africa twenty years ago, matters have 
improved greatly. Liberty of conscience (including religion), freedom of association, and 
‘the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 291) are firmly 
entrenched in the constitution and generally upheld. The political liberties are also in the 
main secure, with South Africa now an established democracy in which each person has 
one vote in fair and free elections, and may stand for office. Recent government attempts 
at heavy-handed press regulation, and the appearance of interference in the judicial 
process, are cause for concern and should be addressed where they appear. The response 
to protests and strike action, most notably the incident in Marikana, which saw 34 
platinum miners shot dead by South African Police Service officers in August 2012, also 
raises serious issues about the rule of law, militarization of policing, and links between 
government and industry.7 But such issues should be considered in the context both of 
the performance of other developing countries and South Africa’s recent history which, 
for instance, saw over 17 million blacks imprisoned under the Urban Area Act’s pass 
laws until its repeal in 1986 (Davenport and Saunders, 2000, p. 511). There is need for 
improvement, but South Africa’s performance as regard’s Rawls’ first objective is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
 Rawls’ next highest objective is to secure fair equality of opportunity. Here, South 
Africa has again seen remarkable improvement, being far removed from the ‘colour bar’ 
which denied Africans access to skilled trades for much of the twentieth century. Even 
so, it may seem that objectionable legal discrimination has reappeared in the guise of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies. Under the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2003, which came into force fully in 2008, companies with annual 
turnover in excess of R35m are expected to achieve specified levels of African, coloured, 
and Asian representation in ownership, management, and employment, as well as pursue 
BEE objectives in skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise development, 
and socio-economic development. Companies with turnover between R5m and R35m are 
expected to comply in four of these seven areas. Might these affirmative action policies 
threaten fair equality of opportunity? 
 To answer this question, we must first note that Rawlsian fair equality of 
opportunity is not limited to removing formal racial or other barriers to employment. 
Rawls understands it as requiring that ‘those with similar abilities should have similar life 
chances’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 63). So where individuals are talented, but their prospects 
threatened by inferior education, for instance, state involvement to improve their 
prospects is justified. There is ample evidence of a historical racial divide in education, 
both in terms of the quality of the output and (in schools) staff/student ratios and 
expenditure, that would have a major impact on the current workforce (Fedderke and 
Luis, 1999; Fedderke et al, 2000, 2003). 2 million African adults, and fewer than 10 
thousand white adults, have received no education (South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2010, p. 373). Inferior health would also be a possible source of inequality of 
opportunity on a Rawlsian scheme (Daniels, 1985, 2008; Rawls, 1993). Health facilities 
were only formally desegregated in the early 1990s, and rates of disease and mortality 
remain much higher for Africans than for whites, both due to inequality of healthcare 
provision and wider social and economic inequalities (Coovadia et al, 2009). 74 per cent 
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of whites have medical aid (private health insurance), compared to only 9 per cent of 
Africans (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2010, p. 468). Thus, affirmative 
action in South Africa might be justified on a Rawlsian basis, as necessary to secure good 
opportunities for those with good abilities who are impended by poor education, and/or 
inadequate healthcare early in life. 
 However, while affirmative action might be justified on grounds of fair equality 
of opportunity, there are two general problems with BEE from that perspective. First, the 
main effect of BEE has to date been ‘narrow’, shifting ownership and control into black 
hands, and such movements of assets and power among, in the main, already elite groups 
obviously falls short of the ideal set by fair equality of opportunity. It does nothing to 
improve the life chances of the vast majority of the (mostly black) underprivileged 
population. Even more recent broad-based BEE is focused on managerial positions, a 
small minority of posts. 
Second, even setting aside this point, and assuming that BEE will eventually 
realize genuinely broad objectives, it is hard to see how affirmative action solely for the 
benefit of particular racial groups might be justified on the basis of fair equality of 
opportunity. The fact that black people on average have worse access to education and 
healthcare does not provide any warrant for, say, black people to receive preferential 
treatment in cases where they have received better education or healthcare. To do so 
would be to increase inequality of opportunity.  
While an African, coloured, or Asian person being better off than a white person 
is not the standard case, it is hardly so unusual as to be negligible. There are millions of 
such cases: for instance, 4 million Africans have personal income in excess of R50,000 
per annum, while 1.5 million whites have personal income of less than R50,000 (South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 2010, p. 245). 8 per cent of African-headed 
households, 27 per cent of coloured-headed households, and 54 per cent of Asian 
households fall in the fifth (top) quintile by consumption, while 16 per cent of white-
headed households fall in the fourth quintile (Statistics South Africa, 2011a, p. 8).  
Furthermore, more money generally means better education and healthcare. The 
top consumption quintile spent an average of R8,003 per year on education, and R2,990 
per year on health, while the fourth quintile spent R1,379 and R820 respectively 
(Statistics South Africa, 2011a, p. 128). It is ludicrous to exercise affirmative action in 
favour of top quintile black people on the basis that they have been disadvantaged where 
they have actually benefited from six times the education expenditure, and four times the 
healthcare expenditure, of white people in the fourth quintile. This is what BEE requires, 
so it clearly cannot be defended on the basis of realizing fair equality of opportunity. As 
Daryl Glaser notes in his critique of BEE, ‘[t]he problem is simple: there can be 
situations where races may be equal but people are not’ (Glaser, 2010, p. 306; see also 
Glaser, 2007). Making advantaged black people even more advantaged, at the cost of less 
advantaged whites, is a bad trade from the individualistic Rawlsian perspective. 
In fact, a version of this problem arises even where two job applicants are of the 
same race, but one is from an advantaged background and the other from a disadvantaged 
background. The problem here is not as extreme as in ‘poor white’ cases, as a poor black 
person would not be competitively disadvantaged as a poor white person would be. But 
fair equality of opportunity requires that similarly capable people have similar life 
chances, and that is clearly not achieved where no preferential treatment is shown for 
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those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Those from poor townships or rural areas, reliant 
on state education of dubious quality, rarely have the qualifications to fairly compete in 
the labour market with the privately-educated offspring of the wealthy, whether the latter 
are black or white. Thus, even setting aside the specific shortfalls of BEE as practiced to 
date, affirmative action for the benefit of particular racial groups is both too 
differentiating and too undifferentiating: it will extend the opportunity shortfall of some 
of the already disadvantaged on the basis that they are white; and it will fail to correct the 
opportunity shortfall of the rest of the already disadvantaged on the basis that being 
disadvantaged is no ground for preferential treatment. 
A policy of affirmative action which targeted special assistance to those who 
suffer from educational, health, and other competitive disadvantages in the labour market 
would be a much more plausible way of furthering fair equality of opportunity. In 
practice, this would amount to socioeconomic affirmative action. Such a policy would 
undoubtedly improve the position of the black population on the whole, but because it is 
predominantly poor rather than because it is black. Rawlsian justice thus suggests the 
rejection of BEE, which should be replaced with broad but non-racially motivated 
affirmative action.8 
Rawls’ third and final consideration is that provided by the difference principle, 
which requires that distributions maximize the income and wealth of the worst off. South 
Africa has, yet again, made great strides in the right direction on this score. Access to 
electricity and clean water, especially in rural areas, has improved markedly since the 
mid-1990s. Social grants have also been extended on a large scale, with 42 per cent of 
households now receiving a social grant (Statistics South Africa, 2011a, p. 38). 
Furthermore, ANC schemes are far more effective at targeting need than were apartheid 
schemes, whose effectiveness was limited by their racial focus. For instance, in 1952 the 
maximum old-age pension for white people was an astonishing twelve times that for 
Africans, and the former remained higher as late as 1993 (Davenport and Saunders, 2000, 
p. 666). Most tellingly, those living on less than $1 per day (at 2005 prices) numbered 1.7 
million in 1996, but only 0.4 million in 2009 (South African Institute of Race Relations, 
2010, p. 271). 
For all these changes for the better, it seems fairly clear that contemporary South 
Africa does not maximize the income and wealth of the worst off group. The difference 
principle does not only prioritize the interests of the very most deprived members of the 
population. Though Rawls is vague on the crucial question of how to define the worst off 
group on which the difference principle focuses (see Lötter, 2010), it seems clear that he 
intends this group to be very large – perhaps as much as a third of the population. When 
we look at the worse off in South Africa in this expanded sense, progress is less apparent. 
The number of people in relative poverty increased from 16 million in 1996 to 19 million 
in 2009 (South African Institute of Race Relations 2010, 272). Furthermore, as my 
opening paragraph noted, the worst-off quintile of households has not even a twentieth of 
the consumption expenditure of the best-off quintile. Given both the persistence of 
widespread poverty, and the presence in society of the resources to tackle it, it is not 
plausible that the state has no means of increasing the worst-off’s income and wealth. For 
instance, income, property, or luxury taxes could be increased, with the revenues 
transferred to the worst off through increased social grants, better service provision, and 
job creation schemes.  
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One possible reply here is that, given the need to maintain international 
competitiveness and see off the threat of ‘brain drain’, higher taxes would be 
counterproductive.9 The economy would suffer if international businesses invest 
elsewhere, or South Africa’s best and brightest are driven to seek their fortune overseas. 
Two points are worth making in reply. First, it seems likely that some higher level of 
taxation, especially of the wealthy, is achievable without a serious loss of international 
competitiveness. For instance, top rate income tax in South Africa is 40%, lower than the 
45% rate in Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While top rate federal income 
tax is lower in Canada (29%) and (by a tiny margin) the United States (39.6%), this is 
more than offset by double-digit provincial and territorial income taxes throughout 
Canada, and state income taxes in 43 U. S. states. An increase in this major tax, at least, 
would not put South Africa at a disadvantage to its major competitors in the international 
labour market. Second, the difference principle is in any case compatible with some loss 
of international competitiveness. Suppose, for instance, that some new strategy of higher 
taxation and public expenditure did result in decreased GDP. This might nevertheless be 
acceptable from a Rawlsian perspective provided that the resulting distribution favoured 
the worst off, as may well be the case given the increased public expenditure. 
Competitiveness concerns do place a limit on how much taxation and expenditure is 
appropriate, as a highly uncompetitive economy would be bad even for the worst off. But 
it seems very likely that the worst off would be better served by higher than present levels 
of taxation and public expenditure. 
While Rawlsian opposition to BBE amounts in practice to a relatively minor 
adjustment of policy, replacing a racial focus with a socioeconomic focus that has similar 
results, Rawlsian opposition to current distributive outcomes is much stronger. Though 
this opposition is not racially motivated, in practice it would generate a net flow of 
resources from the white population to the black population. Still, the redistribution 
would not uniformly take the form of transfers from white to black: rich Africans would 
be just as liable for taxation as rich whites, and Asians, who like whites have a majority 
in the top quintile of consumption of household expenditure, would also be significant net 






The results of applying utilitarianism to contemporary South Africa are apparent once we 
recall that, though utilitarianism is concerned with maximization, it is not concerned with 
maximizing income or wealth, and so does not take, say, economic growth as its primary 
goal. For utilitarians, the key consideration is that of the diminishing marginal value of 
money – the fact that a given amount of money tends to produce more utility when used 
by a poor person than it does when used by a rich person (Singer, 1982; Hare, 1997). For 
instance, R10,000 in the hands of a household in the top quintile will make almost no 
welfare difference: they already spend R228,000 on average, so R10,000 is barely 
noticeable to them. But R10,000 in the hands of a household in the lowest quintile might 
make a big improvement to their lives: they spend only R11,000 on average, so an extra 
R10,000 would allow for a near doubling of expenditure, which for people struggling to 
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make ends might mean the difference between electricity and no electricity, clean 
drinking water and dirty water, a covered or an uncovered toilet. Such improvements 
make for a significant welfare improvement on any of the measures of welfare mentioned 
earlier. Furthermore, such improvements will make for a significant net gain in welfare 
even where they come at much higher monetary cost for the better off: even an R50,000 
loss to the better off would typically have much smaller welfare effects than an R10,000 
gain for the better off. In short, utilitarianism presents a strong case for redistribution to 
the poor, just as the difference principle did. 
 Of course, though this redistribution would generally benefit poor black people, it 
would not recognize racial distinctions as being intrinsically important. Utilitarianism 
similarly presents no support for BEE. It would be a welfare-inefficient use of resources 
to give rich, well-educated black people preferential treatment over poor, badly educated 
white people, for two reasons. First, if two people are equally capable of fulfilling a 
position, and one’s education was inferior, it is likely that the less well educated person 
has greater potential to contribute to the economy. They have managed to achieve the 
same level of capability even with limited opportunities, so in the same position they can 
be expected to achieve more than more privileged rivals. Indeed, this kind of 
consideration is at the heart of the efficiency argument for affirmative action, but it is 
confounded by forms of affirmative action that extend the advantages of already 
advantaged people provided they are of a certain race. Second, notwithstanding any wider 
efficiency benefits to the economy, appointing qualified less privileged persons to 
available positions, regardless of race, clearly generates a more equal distribution, as 
income streams are thereby directed to poorer parts of the community. For the reasons of 
diminishing marginal returns already mentioned, a distribution that favours the worst off 
promotes utilitarian ends better than a highly unequal distribution. 
 A countervailing thought here is that black South Africans might feel better 
knowing that there are policies designed specifically for their benefit.10 As they are a 
large majority, bringing about that positive feeling may have weight for utilitarians. I do, 
however, doubt that this is as important as the two opposed considerations mentioned 
above. First, there are reasons for thinking that this positive feeling may not be very 
widespread. Given that BEE picks out a large majority of the population for preferential 
treatment, it is hard to see why an individual would feel any strong attachment to it. In 
particular, poor black South Africans may feel a stronger attachment to affirmative action 
which picked out the poor for preferential treatment. Socioeconomic affirmative action 
that picked out the bottom two quintiles for preferential treatment would give a poor 
black person a competitive advantage over three-fifths of the population, whereas BEE 
would give them an advantage over less than a tenth of the population. Poor black people 
may, then, begrudge BEE, given that it would only confer a small fraction of the 
competitive advantage of socioeconomic affirmative action. Second, insofar as BEE does 
in fact inspire positive feelings, the extent of its contribution to welfare is probably 
relatively minor. The two opposed considerations I mentioned pinpointed material 
changes – increased productivity and a transfer of assets to the worst off. Even if many 
black people did have positive feelings on account of BEE, in each case the amount of 
welfare increase will be very small, so the sum of these increases may well be less than 
the sum of a smaller number of much larger increases brought about by material 
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improvements (for instance, clean drinking water made available by employment, which 
is in turn made possible by socioeconomic affirmative action).  
 I therefore conclude that utilitarianism delivers a broadly similar result to 
Rawlsian justice in the South African context. It recommends a radical redistribution of 
resources from the rich to the poor, and does so on a non-racial basis. 
 
 
Luck Egalitarianism Applied 
 
In principle luck egalitarianism is compatible with any level of inequality. It does not 
have an intrinsic concern with helping the worst off, just because they are worst off, as 
Rawlsian justice does. Nor is luck egalitarianism concerned with the diminishing 
marginal utility of money, as utilitarianism is: for the luck egalitarianism, it is no 
argument that a more equal distribution would increase welfare, because increasing 
welfare is not its concern. Rather, it is concerned to eliminate involuntary disadvantage; 
voluntary disadvantage is none of its business. 
Is some large part of South Africa’s inequality due to chosen disadvantage? Might 
the racial economic divide be explained in this way? Adherents of such a view might cite 
the fact that 30 per cent of the African working-age population are unemployed on the 
official definition, while only 5 per cent of the white working-age population are 
unemployed on the same measure (Statistics South Africa, 2011b, 6.13). But even were 
such a difference wholly down to individual choice, it could hardly explain why whites 
have five times as much spending power. The relevant statistic is not the number of 
unemployed, whose contribution to household expenditure is relatively small, but rather 
the number of employed. On that measure there is a much smaller difference of 70 per 
cent versus 95 per cent, hardly adequate to justify expenditure of R45,000 versus 
R235,000. Furthermore, the difference in employment is probably attributable to 
disadvantages in, for instance, education and health, and perhaps also racial 
discrimination, that make it harder for black people to get jobs. African-headed 
household expenditure on education is R1,129 per annum and on health R539, compared 
to white expenditures of R6,598 and R3,487 respectively (Statistics South Africa, 2011a, 
p. 104). It is not choice, but lack of opportunity, that often restricts black access to jobs. 
Luck egalitarianism would recognize that as being morally salient, as it makes people 
worse off through no fault or choice of their own. It would therefore make compensatory 
arrangements. These include affirmative action, but as some whites face similar 
disadvantages, and many blacks do not, such affirmative action would not pick out race 
as a relevant category.  
Other luck egalitarian measures would include a more general transfer of 
resources from rich to poor, on the basis that the rich are generally advantaged, and the 
poor disadvantaged, through no choice of their own. The main reasons for this, 
concerning differences, such as those in health and education, that affect life chances 
from an early age, have already been mentioned.  
Are there particular members of the rich who can be picked out as having 
particularly oversized advantages, relative to their choices? If two people are equally 
successful, and the first person had better education and health care early in life, it seems 
that the second person’s success is more wholly a result of their choices than the first 
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person’s, as in the latter case the success is likely to be partly attributable to the initial 
advantages. Luck egalitarianism is therefore inclined to treat the initially more 
advantaged persons’ resources as more open to redistribution. In practice, given the 
continuing effects of apartheid and earlier white domination, that will mean that white 
people are a disproportionately large source of compensation for poor (usually black) 
people. Nevertheless, many black people have privileged backgrounds, and are equally 
liable for compensation. The higher net contribution of those with privileged 
backgrounds would, to some extent, be achieved by increased taxation on income, 
property, and luxuries, which I have already mentioned as desirable for other reasons. It 
might also be extracted in a more precise way through such measures as means-tested 
social grants and university tuition fees, and the aforementioned socioeconomic 
affirmative action. 
Luck egalitarianism also highlights another group, which is not privileged in the 
traditional sense, as a particularly appropriate source of compensation. Major 
beneficiaries of BEE (and especially the ownership- and management-focused BEE that 
has been seen to date) have benefited from a privilege – access to a competitive 
advantage that was denied to others. For its beneficiaries, BEE is the equivalent of manna 
from heaven. It presents an opportunity that has not arisen from the beneficiaries’ 
choices, and from which other relevantly-similarly positioned persons were excluded on 
the arbitrary ground of race. Advantages derived from such opportunities are therefore to 
be treated as unchosen privileges, and subject to luck egalitarian redistribution as are 
other privileges. 
It seems likely, however, that this privilege is less impactful than others. 
Beneficiaries of BEE have benefited from the exclusion of only a small minority of the 
population, while beneficiaries of more familiar privileges (such as private education and 
healthcare) benefit from advantages denied to the majority. As such, the latter seem to 
confer the greater competitive advantage. The important point is that, in assessing fair 
shares, the entire bundle of privilege is taken into account. Hence, though a wealthy BEE 
beneficiary is due less insofar as BEE has benefited them, it may be that they did not 
benefit from other privileges, in which case they are probably due a greater share of their 
assets than is the typical wealthy person. But if a wealthy BEE beneficiary did benefit 
from traditional privileges to a certain extent as well, they would be due even less than 
someone who only benefited from traditional privileges to that extent. 
It is worth emphasizing that the foregoing argument does not say that major BEE 
beneficiaries are guilty of any wrongdoing. Indeed, it does not even say that those with 
privileged backgrounds are guilty of any wrongdoing. These groups are particular targets 
for redistribution on a luck egalitarian scheme because their advantage levels are strongly 






I have argued that three major theories of distributive justice – Rawlsian justice, 
utilitarianism, and luck egalitarianism – exhibit a surprising level of agreement in the 
South African context. They all recommend a large scale redistribution to the benefit of 
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the (predominantly black) poor. A further, more surprising result agreed on by all three 
theories is that this redistribution should be conducted in non-racial fashion. BEE should 
be rejected in favour of socioeconomic affirmative action, as the objectives of fair 
equality of opportunity, utility maximization, and elimination of involuntary 
disadvantage all recommend benefiting those who lack opportunities, rather than some 
particular racial group. This combination of redistribution and affirmative action with 
non-racialism is, I suggest, a promising basis for addressing some of South Africa’s most 
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1 Those in relative poverty live in households that fall below a poverty threshold that takes into account 
both income and household size; for instance, in 2009, the poverty threshold was R1,259 for a one person 
household and R4,544 for an eight person household. 
2 An alternative, avowedly African approach to distribution is presented in Metz, 2009; 2011, pp. 551-554; 
2012, pp. 76-79. 
3 Glaser 2007 and 2010 mention Rawls in an egalitarian critique of racial affirmative action in South 
Africa. 
4 Thad Metz raised this concern. 
5 It may seem puzzling to discuss improving the condition of the worst off and eliminating involuntary 
disadvantage as alternative strategies, rather than alternative descriptions of the same strategy. But while 
the poor certainly tend to be involuntarily disadvantaged, the two strategies are distinct in principle and 
sometimes in practice. For instance, if I have R1000 which I can assign either to A, who is prudent and 
quite poor, or B who is destitute having burnt down his business through his own free will, I would give my 
money to B if I am concerned with improving the condition of the worst off, but to A if I am concerned 
with eliminating involuntary disadvantage. 
6 I do not attempt here to combine the theories into a single pluralistic theory. Arneson’s ‘responsibility-
catering prioritarianism’ is a theory of this sort (Arneson, 1999). I have suggested a similar view elsewhere 
(Knight 2008, 2009). 
7 This case does, of course, also raise the issue of the distribution of income. I address this later in the 
section. 
8 It might be countered that socioeconomic affirmative action is impracticable. It would, however, be a 
relatively simple matter for government to require that any history of private education and medical aid is 
taken into account when assessing applicants, as well as parental wealth. These would serve as better 
proxies for advantaged upbringing than would race. 
9 I thank a referee for urging me to consider this line of argument further. 
10 I owe this suggestion to Thad Metz. 
